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Obstacle to Peace? Ethnic geography and effectiveness of Peacekeeping 
Jessica Di Salvatore 
University of Oxford 





Under which conditions peacekeeping reduces one-sided violence in civil wars? This 
article argues that local sources of violence, particularly ethnic geography, affect 
peacekeeping effectiveness. Existing studies focus on missions’ features, yet 
curbing one-sided violence also depends on peacekeepers capacity to reduce 
opportunities and incentives for violence. Moving from the idea that territorial control 
is a function of ethnic polarization, I posit that  peacekeepers are less effective 
against one-sided violence where power asymmetries are large (low polarization) 
because they (i) create incentives for escalation against civilians and (ii) are less 
effective at separating/monitoring combatants. I use UN mission in Sierra Leone 
from 1997 to 2001 to show that UN troops reduce one-sided violence but their 
effectiveness decreases as  power asymmetries grow.  
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2  
Do local ethnic configurations affect peacekeepers ability to protect civilians? If so, 
under which conditions peacekeepers are more effective at saving civilian lives? 
Existing studies show that variations in the distribution of ethnic groups shape the 
dynamics of civil conflict and explain who are the targets of violence. In particular, 
local-level differences in armed groups’ number and size result in specific dynamics 
of conflict because each configuration corresponds to distinct capacities and 
incentives to use violence. Given that conflict dynamics are very sensitive to 
variations in the balance of power between ethnic groups, peacekeepers’ capacity to 
reduce violence should be conditional on local ethno-demographic factors. However, 
existing studies on peacekeeping neglect these factors and point toward a seemingly 
homogenous curbing effect of peacekeeping on civilian killings. But how do 
peacekeeping interventions interact with ethnicity, and which deployment strategies 
are more likely to be successful in protecting civilians? 
This article bridges theories on the role of ethnicity and territorial control for 
the production of violence in civil war with the literature on peacekeeping 
effectiveness. Both strands of literature focus on factors that are usually studied 
separately but that clearly interact and produce joint effects on the ground. 
Peacekeepers are successful at containing violence against civilians; however, they 
may also inadvertently create incentives for escalation by signalling insufficient 
commitment and changing the balance of power between fighting parties. This 
signalling argument finds empirical support when commitment is measured in terms 
of mission size, with larger and nationally heterogeneous missions being more 
effective at protecting civilians.1 However, it is unclear how peacekeeping itself 
changes the balance of power and, in turn, shapes armed groups’ preferences of 
                                                             
1 Bove and Ruggeri 2015; Hultman et al. 2013. 
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one type of violence over another. My argument is that the capacity of peacekeepers 
to reduce violence against civilians is conditional on local balance of power and 
territorial control held by warring parties. Curbing violence in some locations may be 
more difficult than in others, and increasing the number of blue helmets on the 
ground does not automatically reduce violence. To put it differently, features of the 
conflict can interact with peace missions and affect their success or failure. Hence, in 
order to outline the mechanisms driving some interventions to succeed, the domestic 
environment has to be explicitly considered in the theoretical framework as the locus 
where local sources of hostility and local capacity interact to impact UN peace 
strategies.2  If the objective of peacekeeping is to increase the cost of violence, its 
effect is necessarily conditional on what incentivizes violence among combatants.3 
Since the dynamics of violence are related to territorial control and the ethno-
demographic composition of locations, ethnic configurations are expected to 
influence the success and failure of peace operations.  
The contribution of this study is two-fold. First, the article combines 
information on the ethnic composition of deployment locations with features of the 
mission, hence bridging the gap between research on local sources of violence in 
civil war and peacekeeping effectiveness. In doing so, this article also provides 
evidence of a crucial dilemma policy-makers face when designing missions, namely 
intervening to restore peace without provoking escalation of violence, especially 
against unarmed civilians. Second, it conceptualizes territorial control in relation to 
ethnic patterns. Moving from Tilly’s definition of territorial control as capacity to 
extract resources4, including support and recruit from the local population, larger                                                              
2 Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Lyon 2005. 
3 Regan 2002. 
4 Tilly 1985. 
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share of co-ethnic population is associated with a larger pool of resources and, 
consequently, more solid territorial control. When armed groups recruit and mobilize 
along ethnic lines, variations in ethnic geography changes how combatants use 
violence against civilians and adapt to UN deployment. Fine-grained subnational 
data on ethnic polarization allows to proxy armed groups’ local strength if these 
recruit from an ethnic-based pool of individuals. By putting more emphasis on the 
armed actors’ relative capacity, the empirical analysis of this study investigates how 
one-sided violence dynamics change where peacekeepers are deployed. This 
approach fits well with recent advancements in disaggregating peace missions.5 
Indeed, the contributions highlighted above are mostly a response to the call for 
“Going Micro”6 in peacekeeping studies by focusing more on how peacekeepers face 
varying local conditions. disaggregation is not always necessary, but given the aim of 
this article it is useful to test mechanisms of effectiveness more explicitly and to 
explore interactions that take place locally and for which aggregation would add too 
much ‘noise’. 
 
This article is structured as follows. First, I review the main theories explaining how 
territorial control and ethnic geography affect the dynamics of one-sided violence. 
Then I present state-of-the-art studies on peacekeeping effectiveness and link this 
research strand on mission features to the literature on how ethnicity explains 
patterns and types of violence. In the theoretical section, I formulate hypotheses on 
how UN missions affect violence, conditional on local distribution of power among 
combatants. I argue that the capacity of peacekeepers to forestall the targeting of 
civilians is conditional on pre-deployment balance of power and territorial control.                                                              
5 Ruggeri et al. 2016. 
6 Autesserre 2014. 
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These are central elements in the literature on civilian victimization but largely 
missing in studies of peacekeeping effectiveness. The proposed mechanism is that 
under large asymmetries of power (mirrored by low ethnic polarization), 
peacekeepers are expected to be less effective in curbing one-sided violence 
because their deployment (i) creates incentives for quick escalation in the short-term 
and (ii) makes them less effective at monitoring and separating armed actors 
because frontlines are more blurred and fluid. In the empirical analysis, I propose 
ethnic polarization as an appropriate measure of balance of power and test the 
theoretical expectation with data from UN mission in Sierra Leone in the period 
1997-2001. The main model used to test the hypotheses is a negative binomial 
performed on a matched sample, which reduces model dependency and alleviates 
selection bias. 
 
DYNAMICS OF ONE-SIDED VIOLENCE IN CIVIL WARS 
The literature on civil war has shown that the territorial distribution of ethnic groups is 
related to conflict dynamics7, thus it represents one of the sources of violence that 
peacekeepers have to tackle. Various ethnic configurations result in different targets 
of violence. Also, opponents resort to different types of violence (one-sided, two-
sided, selective, indiscriminate, etc.), depending on the power distribution in a 
location. In particular, violence against civilians has a clear strategic dimension and 
is argued to be a function of territorial control.8 In a scenario where two actors are 
fighting against each other in irregular conflict, civilian cooperation becomes vital, 
and violence is used as mean of coercion to achieve collaboration. According to 
                                                             
7 Toft 2002. 
8 Kalyvas and Kocher 2009; Kalyvas 2006; Wood 2010. 
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Kalyvas (2006), combatants will refrain from victimizing civilians when violence is 
unnecessary or counterproductive. When territorial control is perfectly divided 
between factions, victimizing civilians indiscriminately will push them to balancing, 
i.e. seeking protection from the least violent party. Similarly, in locations where one 
party enjoys complete dominance, indiscriminate violence is off equilibrium. 
Conversely, there is higher likelihood of civilian victimization when territorial control is 
relatively solid but incomplete (hegemonic). As Zhukov notes, however, this 
expectation hinges on the assumption that civilians will choose balancing instead of 
bandwagoning when deciding to cooperate with one faction or another.9 The idea is 
that if two groups have similar territorial control, none of them has enough 
intelligence to identify opponents and pursue selective violence. Indiscriminate 
violence against civilians, on the other hand, would backfire as civilians will then 
support the group that use less violence to seek protection. By relaxing this 
assumption about civilians’ balancing against violent perpetrators, Zhukov shows 
that one-sided violence is also likely in areas that are fully controlled and that even 
opponents in very weak positions may have incentives to target civilians.10 
The relevance of territorial control and power asymmetries among fighting 
groups in explaining one-sided violence is hardly deniable. A similar argument is 
made by scholars who  posit that the geographical patterns of ethnic groups, as a 
proxy for group power, is a determinant of violence.11 If territorial control shapes the 
group’s capacity to extract resources12, including recruits, then the greater one’s own 
relative ethnic share, the larger the pool of potential resources. Therefore the index                                                              
9 Zhukov 2013. 
10 Zhukov 2013, 45. 
11 Costalli and Moro 2012; Klasnja and Novta 2014; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005; Di Salvatore 
2016; Weidmann 2011. 
12 Tilly 1985. 
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of ethnic polarization has been proposed as a measurement of groups’ power based 
on their relative size. Furthermore, as I will argue, we lack information on balance of 
power that varies geographically. Information on warring parties’ size is inappropriate 
for testing theories on local dynamics of competition; ethnic polarization is a precious 
proxy for this purpose.  
Polarization is highest when there is perfect parity between groups, 
resembling bipolarity of control over a territory. The assumption is that two similarly 
large and strong groups will fight more intensely and on a larger scale. Even when 
civil wars are not fought primarily along ethnic lines, the salience of ethnicity may 
increase during the conflict. Selective civilian targeting requires significant 
information to identify opponents. One way to solve the identification problem is to 
rely on features that are easier to detect and can be used to infer loyalty. Hence 
ethnicity can become a salient trait as result of endogenous conflict dynamics that 
may further reinforce its use. Indeed, when civilians realise that their profile, not their 
behaviour, makes them targets of violence, the cost of joining rebels to obtain 
protection is lower than freeriding.13 In line with this logic, while ethnic composition is 
not a good predictor for conflict onset, it explains variation in conflict intensity.14 
Overall, highly polarized societies tend to have more violent conflicts.15 Civilian 
victimization as specific type of violence, however, increases under conditions of 
either high polarization (two large groups) or low polarization, since the asymmetry of 
power makes the smaller group more reliant on coerced civilian support.16 The latter 
point is in accordance with research suggesting that strategic environments with 
                                                             
13 Kalyvas and Kocher 2007. 
14 Esteban and Ray 2008. 
15 Costalli and Moro 2012; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005. 
16 Esteban et al. 2010; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2008. 
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large asymmetries increases the use of violence against civilians by the weaker 
opponent.17 
The arrival of peacekeepers has the potential to change the balance of power 
between groups, even when missions are impartial. The mere presence of 
peacekeepers in some locations alters the opportunity structure for armed actors that 
perpetrate one-sided violence strategically. The next section focuses on the main 
findings concerning peacekeeping missions and their impact on civilian killings. 
 
PEACEKEEPERS AND PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS 
Military intervention in the context of ethnic conflict and civilian killings poses a 
dilemma. The scholarship on peacekeeping has produced, overall, optimistic 
evidence on the effect of peacekeeping on violence against civilians but some 
results are still concerning.18 Several studies show that civilian victimization can be 
prevented only if the peace mission intervenes by explicitly targeting the 
perpetrators.19 On the other hand, other scholars argue that changing the balance of 
power in a civil war by intervening in support of one side creates incentive for the 
“loser” to escalate one-sided violence.20 More recent studies find that UN armed 
personnel reduce civilian killings but unarmed observers are associated with 
increased targeting of civilians during and after the conflict.21 The deployment of UN 
personnel that cannot provide protection to civilians may generate short-term 
motivations for victimizing civilians. Hultman highlights these worrying dynamics, 
                                                             
17 Hultman 2007; Wood 2010. 
18 Di Salvatore and Ruggeri 2017. 
19 Hultman 2010; Krain 2005. 
20 Kathman and Wood 2011; Kathman and Wood 2014. 
21 Hultman et al. 2013; Kathman and Wood 2011. 
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concluding that “missions with clear mandates can help reduce violence and 
enhance the prospects for peace, simply sending troops without the mandate to 
interfere when necessary can be devastating”.22 With the possibility of acting 
proactively, large deployments under robust mandates are expected to reduce 
violence, both against civilians and on the battlefield. Thus interventions to protect 
civilians pose a crucial dilemma: missions that do not signal commitment may 
inadvertently unleash more civilian victimization.23 
Under which conditions does UN peacekeeping is less effective at reducing 
one-sided violence? Based on the existing literature, there are at least two possible 
mechanisms at work. Civilians victimization is more intense if peacekeeping (i) 
changes the existing balance of power among armed groups while (ii) signalling 
insufficient commitment and resolve. On the other hand, there are countervailing 
factors that enable peacekeeper capacity to prevent civilian killings successfully. 
These conditions allow blue helmets to (iii) separate combatants, thereby reducing 
battle-related civilian deaths, and (iv) enforce civilian protection behind frontlines. 
With separation, enforcement and commitment being a function of the contingent’s 
size and mandate, researchers have mostly focused on these mission-specific 
factors; however, the importance of the existing balance of power at the local level is 
largely neglected. If the mechanisms that produce incentives for more one-sided 
violence can be moderated by imposing constraints on opportunities, a conditional 
relationship should exist between successful missions and local capabilities of 
combatants. 
Consistent with this expectation, I argue that the capacity of peacekeepers to 
deter civilian targeting is moderated by the existing conditions on the ground, in                                                              
22 Hultman 2010, 42. 
23 Hultman 2010; Kreps 2010; Kuperman 2008. 
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particular the balance of power and territorial control. So far, the question of how 
territorial control influences peacekeeping effectiveness has been missing in 
peacekeeping research. To measure territorial control, ethnic polarization may 
provide information not only about distribution and power at the local level but also 
about which alternative strategies are available to the conflict parties. If 
peacekeepers create obstacles for direct confrontation, warring parties may have 
incentives to switch from two-sided to one-sided violence, if local conditions give 
them the opportunity to do so. 
 
Peacekeeping and ethnicity: bridging the gap 
Given the limited resources available for missions, peacekeepers cannot intervene 
everywhere. Moreover, more violent locations have higher priority. Peacekeepers 
are indeed sent to conflict with more casualties and, subnationally, to more violent 
areas.24 This violence is not evenly distributed within countries and sometimes 
clusters in specific regions. The dynamics of violence in ethnic conflict, as shown in 
the literature, are a function of the groups’ territorial control25 and capacity.26 As I 
discussed in the previous section, in the context of ethnic strife, the geographic 
distribution of ethnic groups, their number and size capture different relevant 
dimensions of control and capacity. Building on this existing strand of literature on 
ethnicity and one-sided violence, I expect that ethnic geography affects success of 
external interventions. If violence against civilians is used strategically and is related 
to the ethnic configurations of groups, then this factor also influences the decision to 
abandon violence. Intervention by external actors enters this calculation and alters                                                              
24 Costalli 2014; Fortna 2004, 2008; Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Hultman 2010; Ruggeri et al. 2016. 
25 Kalyvas 2006 
26 Wood 2010. 
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the groups’ expectations on the outcome of the conflict and the “attractiveness” of 
violence as tool to achieve their goals. If local conditions that shape incentives and 
opportunity costs for one-sided violence are ignored, peacekeeping may even 
inadvertently backfire and result in comparatively more civilian deaths. This is 
particularly problematic because the decision between confronting the opponent on 
the battlefield and killing his civilian populations are interlinked27 but may require 
different countering strategies. When trying to address one type of violence, 
peacekeepers may be neglecting the other with horrifying consequences. In sum, the 
effect of peacekeeping, as Regan notes, “plays out through the strategic calculation 
between the combatants”.28 I proceed by discussing how peacekeepers change the 
strategic environment for combatants’ actions, thereby rendering some ethnic 
configurations more challenging to for peacekeepers mandated with protection of 
civilians. 
 
The logic of one-sided violence for belligerents is thus also shaped by the 
demography of ethnic groups. If a region is ethnically perfectly homogeneous, it is 
less likely to experience intense conflict. In contrast, where two different groups of 
similar size live close to each other, expected violence should be more intense. In 
this latter example, high ethnic polarization (or parity) forces groups to fight harder in 
order to defeat their opponents. When ethnic groups are strong enough and the 
balance of power is even (in other words, ethnic polarization is high), all-out ethnic 
conflict and two-sided violence is more likely.29 One-sided violence is not completely 
                                                             
27 Hultman 2007; Wood 2014. 
28 Regan 2002, 74. 
29 Morelli and Rohner 2014; Zhukov 2013. 
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absent though, but it is mostly used as complementary tactic.30 Hence, in highly 
polarized areas peacekeepers would mostly be concerned with reducing open 
military confrontation and the resulting civilian casualties. Highly polarized locations 
require a significant deployment of armed troops, signalling a threat for 
transgression. Deployment of large armed personnel is crucial to deter groups, but 
deterrence only works if peacekeeper commitment is credible. This aspects is even 
more important if the size of the mission is used to signal the salience of the conflict 
for the intervener.31 Large military deployments should then successfully reduce 
battle-related violence, but do they also deter civilian killings? Peacekeepers must 
also consider constraining groups from turning on civilians as alternative way to 
damage their opponents. I expect that large military deployments in highly polarized 
areas are less likely to bring about a shift toward civilian victimization for two 
reasons. First, it is easier to separate two similarly sized groups than those living in 
ethnically intermingled locations. Where battlefield clashes are more frequent, 
frontlines are clearer, and peacekeepers can more easily identify where to interpose 
between factions. In other words, highly polarized locations present conditions that 
enable peacekeepers to easy detect violations and completely separate combatants. 
Second, credible commitment signalled by the presence of large numbers of armed 
personnel increases the cost of targeting civilians.32 Weak missions with few troops, 
on the other hand, might still effectively deter groups from large-scale military 
clashes but are less able to constrain strategic shifts to civilian targeting33, especially 
behind the frontlines. 
                                                             
30 Esteban  et al 2010. 
31 Carment and Rowlands 1998. 
32 Hultman et al. 2013; Pushkina 2006; Thyne 2009. 
33 Hultman 2010. 
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In contrast, when ethnic groups differ in size, such as when ethnic polarization 
is low, asymmetry characterizes the distribution of power. Here, dynamics of 
violence look different. The difference in strength makes it unfeasible for the weakest 
party to directly face the other on the battlefield. Such action would be doomed to 
failure, or at least is perceived as such by the disadvantaged group. Indeed, weak 
rebel groups are associated with greater intensity of violence against civilians.34 This 
is the result of two concurring dynamics. First, majority groups are more likely to 
attack minorities if they are vulnerable and isolated from their co-ethnics in 
enclaves.35 Indeed, scenarios of low ethnic polarization are commonly characterized 
by the presence of a majority group that will likely resort to large-scale killings of 
civilians to achieve ethnic homogeneity and remove threats to territorial hegemony. 
Another incentive for escalating one-sided violence during deployment exists from 
the perspective of the majority group. Deployment usually takes time to complete, 
thus the most powerful armed group will try to achieve solid control by killing 
potential opponents before peacekeepers can intervene and reach full-scale 
deployment.36 Two-sided violence, on the other hand, is less common since the 
enclaved minorities are isolated and difficult to protect militarily. Although polarization 
                                                             
34 Wood 2010. 
35 Di Salvatore 2016. 
36 An analogous argument is proposed by Kathman and Wood, who posit that governments with 
genocidal goals will attempt to “complete the liquidation” as soon as external interveners step in 
(Kathman and Wood 2011).  It follows that the quicker the deployment, the narrower the window of 
opportunity for escalation. Indeed, in the case of Sierra Leone, the rapid deployment of troops (British 
troops in particular) across regions held by RUF rebels was a key element of success. It is important 
to highlight, however, that the data at hand does not distinguish ongoing and completed deployment. 
We can only know how many troops are present in a location at time t, not whether this is the 
authorized total number of personnel or a growing contingent. Of course we will observe a higher 
number of personnel at time t+1 if t is in the deployment stage, but the results of the analysis can only 
speak to the impact of different sizes of contingents rather than different stages of the mission. 
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does not capture the extent to which minorities are enclaved and isolated, in the 
Appendix (A3) I illustrate that chiefdoms in Sierra Leone exhibit high correlation 
between polarization and segregation. In polarized locations, groups are highly 
segregated and separated in two or three large and homogenous regions; 
conversely, in less polarized areas, groups are less segregated so that minorities are 
more likely to end up in enclaved territories. The second mechanism has it that 
sufficiently organized minorities resort to guerrilla tactics, terrorism and targeting 
unprotected civilian population as alternative warfare. In particular, one-sided 
violence is crucial for weaker groups to secure civilian support, since they cannot 
compel it by providing other benefits such as security.37 
How could UN peacekeepers prevent both strong and weak groups from 
resorting to one-sided violence? It is already clear that blue helmets face more than 
one challenge when groups have asymmetric territorial control. Groups have 
different incentives and opportunities to kill civilians, thus it is more difficult for 
peacekeepers to tackle both. Compared to the scenario with equally powerful 
groups, separating combatants is less feasible, especially in the context of irregular 
warfare. In addition, even if vulnerable civilians were identified and protected areas 
established, this can further deteriorate civilian safety by making them easy targets, 
as occurred during the Bosnian conflict.38 This discussion leads to the conclusion 
that if the balance of power and territorial control do not favour one side, the 
deployment of UN blue helmets can reduce incentives for one-sided violence. On the 
other hand, it is significantly more difficult for peacekeepers to reduce one-sided 
violence where there is pronounced asymmetry of power and control between the 
warring parties. Thus, the hypotheses are formulated as follows:                                                              
37 Wood 2010. 
38 McQueen 2005. 
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H1: When ethnic polarization is high, more UN Troops decrease violence against 
civilians. 
 
As corollary, we would expect UN Troops to be less effective at decreasing violence 
against civilians at low levels of ethnic polarization. It should be clear at this point 
that ethnic polarization shapes conflict dynamics in different ways, depending on 
whether peacekeepers are deployed in the country. Most of what we know about the 
relationship between ethnic configurations and violence against civilians is limited to 
cases where UN missions are not present. Conversely, the focus here is on the 
conditional relationship between polarization and peacekeeping because the 
decision to target civilians in a given location is a combination of both factors. This is 
the result of polarization and peacekeeping simultaneously producing incentives for 
– but also constraints on – one-sided violence. While I present a pre-deployment 
model with ethnic polarization, I do not explicitly formulate a hypothesis on how 




The choice of Sierra Leone as case study is motivated by two main reasons. First, 
the case selection strategy is a least-likely case, namely a case for which I should be 
less likely to find evidence in support of the proposed argument.39 However, I will 
argue that the role ethnicity played in the Sierra Leonean civil war is commonly 
underestimated in the section describing how I measure balance of power. Second,                                                              
39 Gerring 2007. 
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and relatedly, UNAMSIL was one of the most effective missions in achieving its 
Protection of Civilians (PoC) mandate. This makes the empirical test on this case 
more conservative and less likely to show inefficiencies and pitfalls of the mission. 
Sierra Leone represents an interesting case of UN peacekeeping because it hosted 
two different UN missions during the civil war. UNOMSIL was deployed in 1998 with 
a weak observer mandate, while the UNAMSIL mission deployed in 1999 had a 
robust mandate that explicitly included the protection of civilians. Notably, UNAMSIL 
was also the first UN mission with a Protection of Civilians (PoC) mandate. Indeed, 
Sierra Leone’s population suffered severe large-scale massacres, even after 
UNAMSIL deployment. The transition from UNOMSIL to UNAMSIL was particularly 
critical, with personnel lacking “commonly shared understanding of the mandate and 
rules of engagement”, along with other problems at the level of command and 
control.40 When transition was complete and the UNAMSIL force fully deployed, 
peacekeepers were sent to previously inaccessible areas, significantly increasing the 
geographical coverage of the mission. Overall, UNAMSIL has been labelled as 
example of effective missions and the complete withdrawal of UN personnel in 2014 
was greeted as “the successful conclusion of over 15 years of successive United 
Nations peace operations in Sierra Leone”.41 Finally, the frequent reporting from the 
Secretary General on the UN mission in Sierra Leone is also convenient as it allows 
for more precise information of UN peacekeeping personnel. 
The hypothesized mechanisms hinge on local-level dynamics of power among 
warring parties, thus they call for a subnational data on ethnicity and peacekeeping 
deployment. In fact, data on peace operations is available for other countries than 
Sierra Leone; however the lack of census data that could be georeferenced to                                                              
40 UNSG 2000, §54. 
41 UNSG 2014, §51. 
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calculate local polarization does not allow the inclusion of all sub-Saharan African 
countries experiencing civil wars. Also, aggregating information at the country  level 
would be inappropriate, as peacekeepers are sent to some areas only and, more 
importantly, spatial variation in territorial control would be lost. Whereas the 
subnational design described above is better suited as a test of the conditional effect 
of ethnic polarization on successful civilians’ protection, in the Appendix (A1) I 
present two cross-national models to address concerns over external validity. 
 
I will test the hypotheses of the conditional effect of ethnic polarization on 
peacekeeping effectiveness using a time series cross-sectional dataset with 
administrative division-month as unit of analysis. Geographically, the level of 
disaggregation depends on the availability of data on the subnational distribution of 
ethnic groups before conflict started. For Sierra Leone, data are available for the 
third-order administrative unit, the chiefdom. The sample includes monthly 
observations on 153 chiefdoms from 1997 to 2001, thus one year prior to the first 
UNAMSIL deployment and 5 years into the mission. 
The dependent variable of the analysis is the number of monthly civilian 
killings in each administrative unit (Figure 1, left panel), as derived from the UCDP-
GED.42 The main independent variables are ethnic polarization and the logged 
number of armed personnel deployed by the UN in each month.  
I motivate the choice of ethnic polarization over other candidate measures in 
the next section, then explain how the index is constructed. With regard to the size of 
UN contingents, I rely on United Nations Secretary General (UNSG) Reports, which 
often include a map indicating the position of peacekeepers and the contributing 
                                                             
42 Sundberg and Melander 2013. 
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countries. Unfortunately, these maps do not give information on the size of the 
contingent in each location. Luckily, the UN Department for Peacekeeping 
Operations (UNDPKO) records each country’s monthly contributions to 
peacekeeping by mission and by personnel type. This allows me to estimate the size 
of the mission in the locations indicated by the maps. For example, suppose India 
has contributed 100 troops to UNAMSIL in a given month. If the deployment map in 
the UNSG report indicates Indian troops in two different chiefdoms, I divide India’s 
contribution by two and assign the mean to both chiefdoms. If the map indicates that 
India is contributing in two chiefdoms but only providing troops to one, then only the 
latter is assigned all 100 soldiers. I interact size of UN troops with ethnic polarization 
in order to test my hypotheses.43 Since I hypothesize peacekeeping to moderate the 
effect of polarization, the interaction coefficients should be negative. 
Several control variables from the PRIO grid version 2.0 are included in the 
specification, namely population (log), purchasing power parity (log), night light 
emissions, the number of excluded ethnic groups, distance from capital Freetown, 
and a dummy for the presence of primary diamond mining sites.44 More violence 
should be associated with larger population living far from the capital45 and with the 
presence of aggrieved excluded groups.46 Night light emissions also capture some 
degree of economic exclusion. But more generally they are a good proxy for 
economic condition.47 In addition, proximity to mining sites is likely to result in more 
                                                             
43 Appendix (section A4) also shows a model that measures UN presence as sum of troops and 
police. Results are consistent with main models in Table III.  
44 Tollefsen et al. 2012. 
45 Raleigh and Hegre 2009. 
46 Cederman et al. 2013. 
47 Cederman et al. 2015. 
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confrontation if groups compete over resources to fund their operations.48 
Unfortunately, these variables do not vary much as they are reported at yearly 
intervals. To account for spatial interdependence, the spatial lag of
                                                             
48 Ross 2004. 
20  
20  
Figure 1. Left Panel: Civilian killings in Sierra Leone aggregated by chiefdom (1997-2001) 
Right Panel: Ethnic polarization levels from pre-war census 
21  
21  
 civilian deaths and peacekeeping personnel size is incorporated in all models.49 
Finally, I include a variable measuring the aggregated number of civilian deaths 
before blue helmets had been deployed in each of the chiefdoms. As final remark, all 
covariates are lagged in the previous month in all models. The descriptive statistics 
of all variables are presented in Table I. 
 
Table I. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
      
      
Civilian Deaths 9,660 0.482 10.93 0 864 
Ethnic Polarization 8,940 0.643 0.336 0.068 0.999 
UN Troops (log) 9,660 0.137 0.980 0 8.135 
Population (log) 9,660 9.136 0.757 7.009 10.93 
Purchasing Power Parity (log) 9,660 0.005 0.004 0.0001 0.026 
Capital Distance 9,660 173.3 75.85 26.60 332.3 
Nightlights Emissions 9,660 0.0265 0.007 0.014 0.042 
Diamonds 9,660 0.174 0.379 0 1 
Prior Violence 9,660 27.23 113.3 0 1564 
Excluded Groups 9,660 0.144 0.4 0 2 
 
 
I start with a negative binomial model with clustered standard errors, with the number 
of killed civilians as the dependent variable. The main shortcoming of this model is 
that it does not control for selection bias. Peacekeeper deployment locations are not 
randomly selected, neither at the country nor at the local level.50 In order to attenuate 
selection bias, I will also show results after using Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) 
to compare units with and without peacekeeping that are similar with regard to 
                                                             
49 The spatial lag is constructed on a monthly basis using a First-order Queen Contiguity Matrix. Cells 
in the matrix take value 1 when chiefdom i and chiefdom j share a border. First-order refers to the fact 
that only immediate neighbours are considered contiguous, thus excluding neighbours-of-neighbours. 
50 Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Ruggeri et al. 2016. 
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violence before deployment and ethnic polarization.51 Therefore, I run a negative 
binomial model on the matched sample. The CEM procedure assigns different 
weights to observations to balance substantial differences between the treatment 
and non-treatment group. In addition, to rule out the possibility that unobservable 
factors are driving the selection bias, I also estimated a Conditional Mixed Process 
model (CMP). The CMP models allow relaxing the assumption that conflict intensity 
and presence of peacekeepers are independent, uncorrelated processes. Thus, both 
one-sided violence intensity and peacekeepers presence are used as outcome 
variables in two separate models with correlated disturbances. 
 
Measuring Balance of Power 
Ethnic diversity and groups’ relations are acknowledged as important factors 
explaining conflict onset and intensity. Diversity is measured in several ways, with 
the most prominent measures being ethnic fractionalization, ethnic dominance and 
ethnic polarization.52 Ethnic polarization was used by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol53, 
among others, as an alternative to the traditional ethno-linguistic fractionalization 
index (ELF). Society is described as polarized if there are a few significantly sized 
groups with high intra-group ethnic homogeneity and high inter-group ethnic 
heterogeneity.54 With 𝝅𝝅𝒊𝒊 being the share of the ethnic group over the total 
population, the following formula of polarization index was applied:                                                              
51 Iacus et al. 2011. 
52 See Esteban and Schneider 2008. The index of ethnic fractionalization (ELF) describes diversity 
mostly in relation to the number of ethnic groups. Ethnic dominance is usually measured as a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if one ethnic group represents at least 45% of the total population in a country 
or subnational unit. Notably, none of these two operationalizations directly captures a fundamental 
feature of ethnicity that relates to conflict, namely the relative power of groups. 
53 Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005. 








This formula is a special case of the polarization measure originally proposed 
by Esteban and Ray (1994). With bipolarity indicating the highest level of 
polarization, the index attempts to measure how distant a distribution is from a 
perfect bipolar setting. The measure ranges from 0 to 1, where 1 signifies two 
equally sized groups. In such bipolar setting, ethnic groups represent opposite and 
comparable poles. The interpretation of the polarization index is comparable to the 
power parity index used by Balcells and Balcells, Daniels, and Escriba-Folch55  to 
measure political competition. Indeed, the two measures exhibit a correlation of 
almost 0.9 (Figure A2.1, Appendix), and switching to power parity produces very 
similar results (see Table A2 and Figure A2.2, Appendix). One important aspect of 
the power parity index and the argument proposed by Balcells, however, is that it 
identifies strong competition when the difference between groups’ share is low; that 
is, small margins indicates that groups will compete over this pool with the aim of 
improving their position. The fluidity of political support enables groups to follow this 
strategy, but this is less likely to be successful when support is (at least partly) based 
on ethnicity.   
 Esteban and Ray have explored the relationship between ethnic polarization 
and ethnic fractionalization and their effect on conflict onset and intensity.56 These 
two aspects of conflict are very distinct and related to ethnicity in strikingly different 
ways. As the authors show, the risk of conflict outbreak is higher at intermediate                                                              
55 Balcells 2011; Balcells, Daniels, and Escriba-Folch 2014. 
56 Esteban and Ray 2008. 
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levels of polarization. In extremely polarized societies, conflict is too costly for both 
groups, whereas in societies with low degrees of polarization there might be not 
much to fight for. However, conditional on conflict onset, high polarization is 
associated with very intense violence while the opposite occurs when groups are 
less polarized. 
Polarization captures two very important dimensions of interest for this 
manuscript. First, it proxies local-level extraction capacity of a group, i.e. its territorial 
control compared to opponents. Hence, polarization summarizes the local balance of 
power among groups. In order to connect more clearly armed group to a support 
base, I calculate polarization only for ethnic groups that can be linked to armed 
groups, for example, based on recruitment strategies, claims or support.57 Second, 
high polarization also entails strong intra-group cohesion, which in turn makes 
groups more structured and better able to coordinate large-scale military fights. 
Indeed, while ethnic fractionalization hampers coordination, polarization significantly 
decreases the cost of coordination.58 The distinction between polarized and 
fractionalized ethnic groups has pivotal relevance for the proposed argument. It is 
interesting to note, for example, that Humphreys and Weinstein’s study on abuses 
during the Sierra Leone civil war finds that civilian victimizations is not explained by 
co-ethnicity, but rather is mostly the product of the groups’ internal discipline.59 It is 
clear that the authors do not intend to completely dismiss the role of ethnicity; by 
measuring internal discipline as ethnic fragmentation, the underlying argument 
seems to be that it is not ethnicity per se that matters (0/1 for kinship). Rather, it is 
                                                             
57 Wucherpfennig et al. 2012. 
58 Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005. 
59 Humphreys and Weinstein 2006. 
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important to look at what ethnic diversity entails and how it shapes organizational 
features and strategic use of violence by armed groups. 
 
The index of ethnic polarization is proposed in the manuscript as a well-suited 
measure of balance of power. A better measure of balance of power, of course, 
would be a polarization index based on armed groups’ size instead of the size of 
population from which armed groups potentially recruit. In fact, data on armed 
groups’ size has been collected but only at the group level. Lacking a geographical 
dimension, total armed groups’ size cannot be used to capture balance of power at 
the local level. Alternatively, I could focus on armed groups tactics. Moving from 
Kalyvas and Kalyvas and Balcells60, conventional and symmetric non-conventional 
tactics are dominant in regions where groups’ control is balanced; irregular warfare, 
on the other hand, prevails where groups’ territorial control is unbalanced. However, 
the distinction between conventional, non-conventional and symmetric non-
conventional warfare is ultimately a typology of civil wars, so it is problematic to 
apply it to local-level violence. This is not just a theoretical problem, but also an 
empirical one. For example, Sierra Leone is coded as symmetric non-conventional 
conflict by Kalyvas and Balcells.61 How to identify areas where conflict is fought 
conventionally in the context of an overall non-conventional civil war? One possibility 
is to measure the ratio of battle violence and terrorist attacks in a given location, with 
the assumption that the two types of events mirror respectively conventional and 
non-conventional tactics. In practice, however, determinants of terrorist violence in 
conflict are numerous, thus the measure would rely on more assumption than those 
needed by the ethnic polarization measure (as proposed here). On a more practical                                                              
60 Kalyvas 2006; Kalyvas and Balcells 2010. 
61 Lalyvas and Balcells 2010. 
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note, the Global Terrorism Database only records 33 terrorist attacks for years 1999 
and 2000, thus only covers one year of the UNAMSIL mission. Lastly, one could use 
selective and indiscriminate violence against civilians to identify zones of control, as 
defined in Kalyvas.62 Unfortunately, it is not possible to distinguish the two forms of 
civilian killings with the available data. Furthermore, it is a tautology to use violence 
against civilians (whether indiscriminate or selective) to code balance of power and 
then use it to explain, again, intensity of violence against civilians. Ultimately, ethnic 
polarization is a well-suited candidate to measure balance of power among armed 
groups at the local level. Other measures are proxies themselves and also have less 
desirable features given the purpose of the manuscript. 
 
Ethnic polarization in Sierra Leone.  Figure 1 (right panel) maps the geographic 
variation in ethnic polarization in Sierra Leone. In order to obtain the polarization 
index, I georeferenced the 1963 national census. Using census data prior to the 
conflict ensure that ethnic patterns are not endogenous to conflict dynamics.63 The 
census data are from IPUMS international database of the Minnesota Population 
Center.64 The IPUMS international database provides a representative sample from 
the original national census. In some cases, information is missing for some small 
units because these have been aggregated in the released dataset. In order to 
calculate polarization, I georeferenced the sampled census at the smallest 
administrative unit available and calculated the share of population for each listed 
ethnic group. Based on these shares, ethnic polarization is easily computed with the 
                                                             
62 Kalyvas 2006. 
63 Replicating the analysis using ethnic polarization indexes calculated from census data after the 
conflict (2004) does not yield significant differences in estimated coefficients (not shown). 
64 Minnesota Population Center 2015. 
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formula indicated above. The census lists 18 ethnic groups, with Mende and Temne 
being the two majority groups. Each of the two groups represented more than 30% 
of the total population.  It is worth reiterating that I do not compute ethnic polarization 
among all ethnic groups living in the country, but only among those that were actively 
involved in the conflict and can be linked to armed groups (Temne, Mende and 
Limba); by doing this, the ethnic demographic balance is a better approximation of 
power balance among groups. Although the conflict in Sierra Leone was not 
predominantly centred around ethnic issues65, ethnic identities were significantly 
politicized during the process of state formation and continued to play a role in the 
conflict.66 As Horowitz noted, “ethnicity has not been everything in Sierra Leone 
politics […] yet ethnicity has been so prominent in military and civilian politics that an 
analysis that sorts out ethnic variables is warranted”.67 In particular, Mende 
dominance was a main political issue since independence. There is evidence that 
the Kamajors armed group enjoyed Mende support and made claims on behalf of 
this ethnic group.68 Similarly, Rosen points out that “The Mende based Kamajors 
were the dominant militia group and the CDF [Civilian Defense Forces] leadership 
was largely drawn from the Mende”.69  
In addition, the opposing Revolutionary United Front (RUF) was Temne-dominated 
and claimed to fight against Mende rule, with support from the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC), headed by Limba leaders.70 The instrumental use of 
                                                             
65 Bangura 2004. 
66 Kandeh 1992. 
67 Horowitz 1985, 474. 
68 Wucherpfennig et al. 2012; Minorities at Risk (MAR) available at 
http://www.mar.umd.edu/assessment.asp?groupId=45103. 
69 Rosen 2015, 153. 
70 Minorities at Risk (MAR) available at http://www.mar.umd.edu/assessment.asp?groupId=45103. 
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ethnic identities and the subsequent mobilization along ethnic lines did occur to 
some extent in Sierra Leone, and the civil war should not be reduced to mere 
competition over diamonds.71 Both CDF and RUF necessitated co-optation of local 
elites. In the case of CDF this was largely due to their nature of community-based 
armed group that emerged as counter-insurgent pro-government militia. In the case 
of RUF, this was related to their rapid expansion and need to control of diamond 
sites.72 In both cases, recruiting members in areas that fell under each militias’ 
control meant that having a larger pool of potential recruits was particular important 
in explaining conflict dynamics. 
Consistently, the map in Figure 2  further corroborates the link between major 
ethnic groups and armed factions. The map shows chiefdoms where the three ethnic 
groups linked to armed groups represented the majority. Mende people were the 
majority group in most southern chiefdoms, while Temne and Limba people were 
majority groups in several northern chiefdoms. In order to assess, to some extent, 
the degree of military control, I geocoded establishment of headquarters by 
Kamajors, AFRC and RUF using ACLED.73 Setting up of headquarters stems from a 
variety of strategic and tactical choices of armed groups; furthermore, some 
headquarters are just temporary bases. Nonetheless, taken with a pinch of salt, the 
map in Figure 2 illustrates how armed groups in Sierra Leone tended to establish 
headquarters in areas where the ethnic group they are linked to is demographically 
dominant. With this map, in fact, I do not argue that headquarters measure territorial 
control unambiguously, rather that if armed groups are linked to ethnic groups, they 
                                                             
71 Kalyvas 2001; Schraml 2012. 
72 Johnston 2008. 
73 Raleigh et al. 2010. 
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will more likely base their key activities in areas where more ethnic support is 
expected. 
 
Results and discussion 
The negative binomial models are presented in Table II. Model 1 uses only 
the sample of chiefdoms-months before the deployment to look at dynamics of one-
sided violence when no UN mission was present. In this model, I include all variables 
except those measuring peacekeeping. This baseline model indicates that one-sided 
violence is severe where polarization is high. It also seems that there is some degree 
of contagion across neighbouring chiefdoms, as the positive coefficient of the spatial 
lag suggests. More populated areas and locations with higher nightlight emissions 
are also associated with more violence, though at a lower significance level (p<0.1). 




Figure 2. Ethnic majorities and Armed Groups' Headquarters 
 
 
The estimated coefficients show that peacekeeping has a negative effect on civilian 
victimizations. The size of the military personnel deployed by the UN is associated 
with a reduction in civilian deaths in the following month, in line with most recent 
findings from Hultman et al.74 Ethnic polarization has a positive coefficient, 
suggesting that civilians are targeted in areas where the balance of power among 
factions approaches parity; however, the coefficient is not statistically significant. 
Among the control variables, significant estimates are reported for the number of 
                                                             
74 Hultman et al 2013. 
31  
31  
civilians killed in the previous month in the chiefdom and its surroundings. 
Interestingly, UN Troops might reduce on one-sided violence not only in the unit 
where they are deployed, but also in its surroundings (as suggested by the negative 
coefficient of the spatial lag for UN military, although it is only significant at the 10%). 
In Model 3, I interact ethnic polarization with UN troop size. None of the component 
terms of this interaction is significant, but the interaction term has the expected 
negative and statistically significant coefficient.  
This provides initial support to the idea that peacekeepers are better able to 
protect civilians in locations where combatants can be separated effectively and 
where the symmetry of power is not significantly altered by the presence of UN 
personnel. Conversely, when polarization is low and one group tends to be the 
hegemon, it is difficult to separate it from the minority group (especially if the latter is 
scattered), and civilians can be victimized both by the weaker group and the 
hegemonic one.75 
As discussed before, the main limitation of the negative binomial models is 
that they do not account for selection bias. It is important to recognize that neither 
the CMP models nor the CEM technique fully address the problem of endogeneity, 
but they do attenuate it under certain conditions. Coarsened exact matching 
alleviates selection bias under the assumption that observable factors responsible 
for the selection are accounted for. Because peacekeepers are usually sent to more 
violent areas, I perform matching based on distance from capital, level of violence                                                              
75 Other models, including a dummy for mandate robustness (not reported), show that a robust 
mandate improves peacekeeper performances in protecting civilians. Furthermore, this is not 
conditional on the local balance of power. It is likely that the micro-level use of one-sided violence is 
affected more by the local peacekeeping strategy instead of its larger operational setting described by 
mandate type. Additionally, the dummy used to measure robustness is basically a dummy for the 
UNAMSIL mission, so might be capturing something about  civil war phases. 
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prior to the deployment, and the measure of ethnic polarization. The imbalance of 
the sample dropped from 0.97 to 0.55, and as expected, the size of the sample also 
shrunk from more than 9,000 observations to 7,790.76 
The results of the post-CEM negative binomial estimation are presented in 
Table III. The empirical findings for the main variables of interest are similar to those 
reported in the non-matched models (Model 2 and Model 3). In Model 4, the log of 
UN Troops has a negative coefficient as expected, while polarization does not reach 
statistical significance. When interacted in Model 5, neither polarization nor UN 
Troops seem to have independent effects on civilian killings, as inferred from the 
estimated coefficients. Consistent with theoretical expectations, there is an inverse 
conditional relationship between the two. Figure 3 plots the marginal effect of 
average UN troop size on civilian deaths, conditional on different levels of ethnic 
polarization. For extremely low levels of ethnic polarization, UN Troops do not have a 
significant curbing effect on one-sided violence, although their deterrent capacity 
improves at higher degrees of polarization. In more substantive terms, Figure 4 plots 
the predicted number of civilian killings in chiefdoms that experienced significant 
levels of violence. Across levels of polarizations, more troops always result in less 
civilian deaths but the drop in civilian killings is more pronounced in chiefdoms with 
high polarization. In chiefdoms where ethnic polarization is bat the first quartile (0.3), 
100 (1000) troops result in 8 (3) civilian victims, but the same amount of troops 
produce only 2 (≈ 0) victims in highly polarized areas (0.9, which corresponds to the 
third quartile). 
 This analysis in line with of previous research finding that more UN Troops 
can create a buffer between combatants and reduce civilian targeting on a monthly                                                              
76 Notice that the algorithm does not use replacement, meaning that control observations are not used 
multiple times to match treated observations. 
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basis. However, the results shown so far qualify this claim. Peacekeepers are clearly 
more successful when power symmetries exist locally and factions can be kept 
apart. As these favourable conditions change and power asymmetries prevails, 
however, peacekeeping is a less effective instrument to protect civilians.  
As mentioned, the estimations of the negative binomial model after matching 
are less sensitive to specification and model dependence. Furthermore, the smaller 
imbalance among observations alleviates the selection bias. It is important to note, 
though, that this statement holds true under the assumption that selection occurs on 
observable variables used to weight observations. To rule out the possibility that 
unobservable factors are responsible for the non-random deployment of troops, I use 
CMP estimation to address the endogeneity problem by simultaneously estimating 
two equations with correlated disturbances. If there are unobservable factors that 
influence peacekeepers deployment and one-sided violence, the model should 














Table II. Negative Binomial Models 
 Baseline Pre-PK Baseline with PK Baseline interaction 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables    
Ethnic Polarization 1.312* 0.750 0.795 
 0.504 0.501 0.506 
UN Troops (log)  -0.418* 0.057 
  0.136 0.270 
Ethnic Polarization # 
UN Troops (log) 
  -1.151* 
   0.486 
Civilian Deaths 0.039* 0.056* 0.054* 
 0.016 0.021 0.020 
Population (log) 0.591+ 0.384 0.418 
 0.323 0.338 0.337 
Purchase Power 
Parity (log) 
69.582 104.508+ 90.320 
 71.636 63.091 61.625 
Capital Distance 0.003 -0.000 -0.001 
 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Nightlights Emissions 51.199+ 43.509+ 42.511+ 
 26.956 23.748 23.952 
Diamonds (primary) 0.491 0.756 0.747 
 0.561 0.492 0.493 
Prior Violence 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 . 0.002 0.002 
Civilian Deaths 
(spatial lag) 
0.194* 0.208* 0.212* 
 0.070 0.071 0.072 
Excluded Groups 
(EPR) 
-0.531 -0.314 -0.326 
 0.414 0.402 0.402 
UN Troops (spatial 
lag) 
 -0.002+ -0.536+ 
  0.001 0.292 
Constant -9.665* -7.248* -7.473* 
 2.680 2.778 2.770 
lnalpha 4.284* 4.939* 4.936* 
 0.134 0.130 0.130 
N 3576 9499 9499 
AIC 2270.588 3345.403 3345.753 
BIC 2338.590 3444.544 3451.975 
Clustered Standard Errors in parenthesis 














As for the specification of the equation with peacekeeping personnel size as a 
dependent variable, I include polarization, civilian deaths (time and spatial lag), 
population and distance from the capital as covariates. This is based on research 
showing that peacekeepers are deployed in the most violent locations, usually in 
proximity to urban centres.77 The results for the CMP models are reported in Table 
IV. The most relevant result is that the correlation parameter atanrho is not 
significant in both Model 6 and Model 7. In other words, there are no unobservable 
omitted variables correlated to both mission size and civilian casualties. This does 
not suggest that there is no selection bias at work rather that it was most likely 
captured by observable covariates used in the analysis.78 Consequently, the 
estimates presented in Table III are further validated. 
Table V presents additional models to check the robustness of the results. In 
Model 8, the actual count of troops is used as covariate instead of its logged 
transformed version. In Model 9, I included a dummy that equals 1 when a robust 
mandate was deployed. In Model 10, presence of peacekeepers is coded as 1 
instead of being measured in terms of troop size. Finally, in Model 11 I estimate an 
OLS model with chiefdom fixed effects. Across all models, the conditional effect of  
 
                                                              
77 Ruggeri et al. 2016. 
78 Interestingly, the correlation parameter is significant when mission size is replaced with a dummy 
variable for peacekeeper presence; however, it is negative. According to this model (not shown), 
peacekeepers are less likely to be deployed where more civilians were killed in the previous month 
and in neighboring areas. While this seems counterintuitive, it might be due to delayed 
responsiveness by the mission. The fact that peacekeepers do go to the most violent areas is 
confirmed by the positive and significant coefficient for the variable measuring intensity of violence 
before the mission starts. Deployment is also more likely in more populated areas and close to the 
capital. These results are consistent with the subnational analysis on deployment of peacekeepers by 
Ruggeri et al. (2016). 
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Table III. Negative Binomial Models and Matched Sample 
 Neg. Bin CEM Neg. Bin. CEM interaction 
 Model 4 Model 5 
Variables   
Ethnic Polarization 0.471 0.506 
 0.636 0.641 
UN Troops (log) -0.370* -0.068 
 0.111 0.180 
Ethnic Polarization # UN 
Troops (log) 
 -0.760* 
  0.350 
Civilian Deaths 0.025 0.025 
 0.021 0.021 
Population (log) 0.381 0.380 
 0.375 0.377 
Purchase Power Parity (log) 140.220* 139.188* 
 38.147 38.298 
Capital Distance 0.005 0.005 
 0.003 0.003 
Nightlights Emissions 10.006 9.913 
 36.356 36.600 
Diamonds (primary) -1.721* -1.724* 
 0.671 0.675 
Prior Violence -0.001 -0.001 
 0.001 0.001 
Civilian Deaths (spatial lag) 0.195* 0.194* 
 0.064 0.064 
Excluded Groups (EPR) 0.390 0.386 
 0.972 0.976 
UN Troops (spatial lag) -0.404 -0.401 
 0.341 0.343 
Constant -6.911+ -6.901+ 
 3.734 3.760 
lnalpha 3.960* 3.959* 
 0.615 0.615 
N 7790 7790 
AIC 5401.354 5401.584 
BIC 5498.803 5505.993 
Clustered Standard Errors in parenthesis 









Table IV. Conditional Mixed Processes Models 
 CMP CMP Interaction 









DV: UN Troops 
(log) 
Ethnic Polarization 0.015  0.016  
 0.014  0.014  
UN Troops (log) 0.004  0.011  
 0.006  0.010  
Ethnic Polarization # 
UN Troops (log) 
  -0.010  
   0.009  
Civilian Deaths (log) 0.160* -0.024+ 0.160* -0.024+ 
 0.037 0.014 0.037 0.014 
Population (log) 0.007 0.065+ 0.007 0.065+ 
 0.011 0.039 0.011 0.039 
Purchase Power 
Parity (log) 
3.978  3.977  
 3.110  3.085  
Capital Distance 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Nightlights Emissions 0.311  0.321  
 0.550  0.552  
Diamonds (primary) -0.006  -0.005  
 0.015  0.015  
Prior Violence -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 
 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Civilian Deaths 
(spatial lag) 
0.205* -0.129* 0.204* -0.129* 
 0.068 0.046 0.068 0.046 
Excluded Groups 
(EPR) 
-0.011  -0.011  
 0.009  0.009  
UN Troops (spatial 
lag) 
-0.009 0.154* -0.009 0.154* 
 0.006 0.071 0.006 0.071 
Constant -0.081 -0.398 -0.080 -0.398 
 0.090 0.376 0.090 0.376 
     
atanhrho -0.018 -0.017 
 0.012 0.011 
N 9499 9499 
AIC 32467.218 32468.428 
BIC 32631.874 32640.243 
Clustered Standard Errors in parenthesis 
* p<0.05, + p<0.10 
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Table V. Models for Robustness Check 













Ethnic Polarization 0.813 0.203 0.911+ (dropped) 
 0.505 0.595 0.504  
UN Troops 0.002 -0.002  0.010 
 0.001 0.241  0.007 
Ethnic Polarization # UN 
Troops 
-0.008* -1.045*  -0.017* 
 0.003 0.430  0.009 
PK dummy   -0.003  
   1.839  
Ethnic Polarization # PK 
dummy 
  -7.781*  
   3.005  
Robust mission  -2.804*   
  0.444   
Civilian Deaths (lag) 0.054* 0.052* 0.055* 0.377* 
 0.020 0.018 0.021 0.067 
Population (log) 0.431 0.341 0.393 0.258* 
 0.335 0.397 0.337 0.111 
Purchase Power Parity (log) 83.817 51.219 97.351 54.171* 
 61.122 61.709 62.234 17.260 
Capital Distance -0.001 -0.003 -0.000 (dropped) 
 0.003 0.003 0.003  
Nightlights Emissions 41.392+ 123.448* 35.347 0.272 
 24.037 21.778 24.532 0.623 
Diamonds (primary) 0.742 0.647 0.692 (dropped) 
 0.494 0.535 0.507  
Prior Violence -0.000 0.009 0.000 -0.001* 
 0.002 0.006 0.003 0.000 
Civilian Deaths (spatial lag) 0.211* 0.106 0.214* 0.168* 
 0.073 0.065 0.074 0.056 
Excluded Groups (EPR) -0.335 -0.167 -0.343 -0.025 
 0.401 0.429 0.408 0.029 
UN Troops (spatial lag) -0.536+ -0.218  -0.003 
 0.294 0.286  0.006 
Constant -7.546* -6.747* -7.321* -2.568* 
 2.759 3.399 2.784 1.063 
N 8791 8791 8791 8791 
AIC 3346.956 3304.532 3347.711 7282.224 
BIC 3453.178 3417.836 3446.852 7345.957 
Clustered Standard Errors in parenthesis 




peacekeeping on polarization is significant. When using fixed effects, however, 
polarization drops out because of its time invariance. Finally, it is worth noting that 
measuring peacekeeping as 0/1 confirms that peacekeepers are more effective in 
decreasing violence where polarization is high. However, when plotted, the 
conditional effect of the dummy variable is much less precise compared to the 
conditional effect of deployment size, suggesting that we do need to account for the 
actual number of troops on the ground. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This article shows how the local distribution of power among ethnic groups affects 
the ability of UN peacekeepers to protect civilians. The reduction of conflict intensity 
supported in the existing literature does not uniformly affect all conflict-torn locations; 
rather it is mediated by local groups’ capacity and their incentives for one-sided 
violence. The deployment of a mission alters these existing conditions that produce 
violence in ways that can be unexpected and tragic. Existing research finds that 
some external peace initiatives may even spur more civilian victimization instead of 
deterring it. Based on the empirical findings for the UN missions in Sierra Leone, 
there is support for the general hypothesis that effectiveness of peacekeeping is 
conditional on power distribution, as measured by the ethnic polarization score. In 
accordance with recent studies, missions with large contingents are found to 
effectively reduce violence against civilians, but this effect is conditional on ethnic 
power configurations. When there is asymmetry among warring parties, protecting 
civilians is significantly more difficult. Ethnic groups are intertwined and cannot be 
separated easily, as it is when polarization among group is low. So it is harder for 
external actors to monitor the use of violence, especially behind blurry frontlines. In 
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these settings, the significant power asymmetry may even push weak group against 
civilian targets, to either coerce them into supporting it or to inflict losses on 
adversaries. Similarly, the dominant group may also has motivations to escalate 
violence against civilians to secure its position before a full-scale mission is 
interposed. In the case of UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, this meant that in chiefdoms 
with low polarization peacekeepers had either a very small curbing effect or no effect 
at all. We can imagine, however, that civil wars with deeper ethnic cleavages this 
dynamic may spiral and potentially result in UN missions inadvertently backfiring and 
provoking escalation of one-sided violence. 
The findings of this research shed some light on the local dynamics of the 
targeting and protection of civilians. By adopting a spatially and temporally 
disaggregated approach, it provides evidence of how blue helmets presence in a 
location may reduce civilian casualties with varying levels of effectiveness. Violence 
against civilians exhibits fluctuating patterns that, as noted by Heldt79, point toward 
the triggering role of local circumstances. Some circumstances are pre-existing (i.e. 
territorial control) while others are the result of the interventions itself, but both 
requires local-level perspectives to be explained. Furthermore, policy implications 
are not trivial. As mass-killings plaguing Africa and the Balkans made clear in the 
early 1990s, deployment coupled with ethnic cleavages can have unintended 
consequences – even more so if the geography of ethnicity and territorial control that 
shape strategic use of violence are not taken into account when interventions are 
planned. Indeed, perpetrators react to interventions differently; if prevented from 
directly engaging their opponents some belligerents will target civilians when 
opportunity cost is low. Peace missions need to consider to what extent interventions 
                                                             
79 Heldt 2010. 
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may make civilians more exposed to brutal attacks. At the core of this concern lies 
an information gap about local conditions and group capacity. In the last High-level 
Independent Panel on Peace Operations80, protection of civilians was defined as a 
moral responsibility for UN members. Addressing safety needs of civilians at risk, 
however, entails a grounded and thorough assessment of the threat, also involving 
considerations on armed forces and “local sources of resilience”.81 The more field-
focused approach outlined and repeatedly recommended in the report has the 
potential to fill the information gap and help peacekeepers in accomplishing their 
protection mandate. 
  
                                                             
80 United Nations 2015. 
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A1. CROSS-NATIONAL RESULTS 
Table A1 is a replication of  country-month analysis by Hultman et al (HKS)82, with 
the addition of the polarization index and its interaction with military peacekeepers. 
Yearly data on ethnic polarization is from Bove and Elia.83 Model A1 in Table A1 is a 
replication of the HKS’ negative binomial. As in Hultman et al, UN troops report a 
consistently negative coefficient but their curbing-capacity against one-sided 
violence, as found in the manuscript, appears to be conditional on national levels of 
ethnic polarization. As polarization grows (Figure A1), the effect of peacekeepers 
becomes larger, suggesting that higher polarization creates conditions for more 
effective PoC (protection of civilians) tasks. As polarization approaches 0.4, 
confidence intervals get very large and the effect vanishes, but this is due to the fact 
that in this sample observations up to the 95th percentile are below 0.39. 
  
                                                             
82 Hultman et al 2013. 
83 Bove and Elia 2017. 
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Table A1. Cross-National Models with all PKO missions in Sub-Saharan Africa (1991-2008) 
 Model A1 
  
Variables Neg. Bin. 
 
Ethnic Polarization 5.561+ 
 2.909 
UN Troops/1,000 -0.023 
 0.023 
Ethnic Polarization # UN Troops -0.331+ 
 0.196 
UN Police/1,000 -0.733* 
 0.279 
UN Observers/1,000 1.357* 
 0.231 
Battle-related Deaths 0.000 
 0.000 
OSV (t-1) 6.774* 
 0.330 
UCDP Incompatibility (1=Terr; 2=Govt) 2.344* 
 0.424 
Duration of Conflict Episode -0.004 
 0.003 







Standard Errors in parenthesis 










A2. ETHNIC POLARIZATION AND ETHNIC POWER PARITY 






Table A 2. Replication of Model 5 in Table III with ethnic power parity 
 Model A2 
 Replication of Model 5 
Variables  
Ethnic Power Parity 0.663 
 0.578 
UN Troops (log) -0.151 
 0.136 
Ethnic Power Parity # UN Troops (log) -1.579* 
 0.655 
Civilian Deaths 0.025 
 0.020 
Population (log) 0.446 
 0.379 
Purchase Power Parity (log) 130.320* 
 38.378 
Capital Distance 0.004 
 0.004 
Nightlights Emissions 1.369 
 37.722 
Diamonds (primary) -1.710* 
 0.651 
Prior Violence -0.001 
 0.002 
Civilian Deaths (spatial lag) 0.181* 
 0.063 
Excluded Groups (EPR) 0.367 
 0.984 









Clustered Standard Errors in parenthesis 











A3. POLARIZATION AND SEGREGATION 
One of the assumptions made in the operationalization of territorial control as ethnic 
polarization is the degree of segregation at different levels of polarization. I argue 
that  in chiefdoms with high polarization level, groups have similar size and will 
confront each other militarily along relatively clear separation lines. On the other 
hand, when polarization is low, there is usually asymmetry in size. While having two 
large groups makes it easier for individuals to move towards their co-ethnics and, 
thus, segregate, this is more complicated for minority groups that are surrounded by 
a dominant group. As result, low polarization corresponds also to intermingling of the 
minority group in areas inhabited by the majority group.  
 
Ethnic polarization does not measure the degree of segregation. In this section, I 
show that, in the case of Sierra Leonean chiefdoms, ethnic polarization strongly 
correlates with segregation index. As measure of segregation, I use the isolation 
index provided by Glennerster, Miguel, and Rothenberg in their replication 
dataset.84The isolation index measures the exposure of a minority group to the 
majority group in a given unit. If there is high segregation (groups are physically), the 
index will approach 1. As intermingling increases, the index decreases toward 0. As 
depicted in Figure A3, in more polarized chiefdoms groups are more segregated, 
meaning they are separated and inhabit homogenous areas within the chiefdom. 
Conversely, as segregation shrinks, polarization follows the same reduction. Notice 
that segregation indexes do not consider relative size of groups and thus are a poor 
measure for local balance of power. 
                                                              
84 Glennerster, Miguel, and Rothenberg 2013. 
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A4. TOTAL UN ARMED PERSONNEL 
Table A 3. Negative Binomial model with both UN Troops and Police 
 Model A3 
 Total PK Armed Personnel 
Variables  
UN PK (Troops&Police) -0.008 
 0.237 
Ethnic Polarization 0.786 
 0.508 
Ethnic Polarization # UN PK -0.997* 
 0.419 
Civilian Deaths 0.053* 
 0.020 
Population (log) 0.412 
 0.338 
Purchase Power Parity (log) 95.297 
 62.701 
Capital Distance -0.001 
 0.003 
Nightlights Emissions 43.377+ 
 24.017 
Diamonds (primary) 0.791 
 0.489 
Prior Violence -0.000 
 0.002 
Civilian Deaths (spatial lag) 0.212* 
 0.072 
Excluded Groups (EPR) -0.341 
 0.398 









Clustered Standard Errors in parenthesis  
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